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THE NEW MARKET DYNAMIC: THE
RELEVANCE OF ANTITRUST LAW TO AN
EMERGING TECHNOLOGY
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ABSTRACT
Commercial-skipping technology can liberate the consumer
and make the television business more competitive. It rose to
prominence with the advent of the digital video recorder (DVR),
also known as the personal video recorder (PVR). PVRs have
helped advertisers reach their target audience more effectively
through personalized advertisements, and it has successfully
pressured television networks and advertisers to innovate more
appealing ways to induce consumers to buy advertised products.
But even if this technology fails to enhance the business of
television, television networks can still outpace commercialskipping technology in an arms race. Through competitive
pressure, such technology promotes innovation, progress, and a
more competitive market without posing an undue burden on the
entertainment industry.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
At first glance, the American jurisprudence of copyright and
antitrust law appear to be in tension. 2 Antitrust seeks to break the
“restraints on trade” associated with market power, 3 while copyright law

1

J.D. & L.L.M. in International and Comparative Law, Duke University School
of Law, 2009. The author thanks Professor Bellemare and Professor Richman
for their comments and guidance, and his parents for their encouragement.
2
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 372 (The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press 2003) (“Then, too, it is widely believed that intellectual
property law and antitrust law are enemies—that intellectual property authorizes
patent and copyright (and perhaps also trademark and trade secret) monopolies
that offend antitrust principles.”).
3
See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282-83 (6th Cir.
1898) (“But where the sole object of both parties in making the contract as
expressed therein is merely to restrain competition, and enhance or maintain
prices, it would seem that there was nothing to justify or excuse the restrain, that
it would necessarily have a tendency to monopoly, and would therefore be
void.”).
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rewards the creators of innovative works with a monopoly for a limited
period of time. 4 Nevertheless, they both stem from the same English
common law origins: “Whatever is injurious to the interests of the public is
void on the ground of public policy.” 5 Whether copyright promotes
monopoly or antitrust breaks it up, the object remains the same: to secure
“the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.” 6
The benefits to the public derive from competition via decreased prices or
increased quality. 7 Even the tendency of copyright law to confer monopoly
status spurs competition to create among authors and inventors.
¶2
Accordingly, the economic perspective of antitrust law can guide
the development of copyright law, particularly in regards to the new
questions presented by emerging technologies. For example, with the
advent of VCRs, the Supreme Court conducted an economic analysis to
apply copyright law to this new technology in Sony Corporation of America
v. Universal City Studios. 8 Like antitrust law, the interests of the consumer
are paramount. “Reward to the owner” constitutes “a secondary
consideration.” 9 Monopoly status to the copyright owners, in this case the
entertainment industry represented by Universal City Studios and Walt
Disney, served only to further “the general benefits derived by the public.”10
Although the entertainment industry lost this case, the loss created more
business from the proliferation of VCR technology. It opened up new
markets and means of distribution, 11 namely, the “home-viewing” market.12
¶3
The same may prove true for the relationship between the
technology industry and the entertainment industry today. Specifically,
commercial-skipping technology could provide consumers with greater
autonomy and provide the entertainment industry with increased revenue by
4

United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The
copyright law, like patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration.”).
5
Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282 (quoting Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735 (1831)).
6
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
7
See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332 (1904) (finding that
allowing monopolies to remain intact would destroy the public benefits of
competition).
8
464 U.S. 417, 456 (1983) (considering impact of the technology on market for
plaintiff’s copyrighted works).
9
Id. at 429.
10
Id.
11
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003).
12
See Matthew Fagin et al., Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law to Advance
and Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451, 499-500
(2002) (“The movie industry, for example, feared and fought VHS technology,
although the technology eventually revitalized the movie business by opening a
secondary ‘home-viewing’ market.”).
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making television more appealing and competitive with other forms of
entertainment. 13 Television has lost viewers because of the increasing
popularity of the internet, but research indicates that commercial-skipping
technology can make television a more competitive entertainment medium.
Viewers who purchased a particular brand of DVRs watched an average of
three hours of television more than they did before they made their
purchase. 14
¶4
Because this technology may ultimately make the television
business more competitive, it does not fall under the ambit of MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster. In Grokster, the Supreme Court
held peer-to-peer music sharing networks liable for inducing copyright
infringement to the harm of music studios. 15 In contrast, commercial
skipping technology promotes what the Grokster Court sought to preserve:
“innovation having a lawful promise.” 16 This term can be defined with the
insights of Joseph Schumpeter, who argued that the “creative destruction”
of obsolete technologies, market strategies, and commercial values
ultimately fuel the capitalist economy. 17
¶5
Part I of this iBrief will summarize the history of television
commercials to provide a context for how Schumpeter’s wisdom and legal
precedent applies to commercial-skipping technology and DVRs. Part II
will illuminate how these technologies further consumer interest. Part III
reveals how these technologies ultimately advance commercial interests.
Part IV contains an antitrust approach to market power to prescribe the ideal
relationship among these competing interests: Copyright laws that promote
creativity in television should not discourage the development and
distribution of commercial-skipping technology. Commercial-skipping
technology does not infringe upon copyright protection as some members of
13

See Michael Lewis, Boom Box, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 13, 2000,
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/13/magazine/boom-box.html (reporting
concerns that the internet is gaining more consumers at the cost of television
companies and suggesting that emerging technologies are attracting more
viewers).
14
Id. (noting that the data was gathered and reported by SonicBlue, a
manufacturer of this technology).
15
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. 545 U.S. 913, 936–37
(2005).
16
Id. at 937.
17
See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 84, 96
(Routledge 1994) (1942) (“Progress entails, as we have seen, destruction of
capital values in the strata with which the new commodity or method of
production competes.”); see also STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE
DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE 160 (Johns Hopkins
University Press 1990) (1971) (observing how legal precedent supports the
process of creative destruction).
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the entertainment industry claim, but rather, promotes a more competitive
entertainment industry.

I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TELEVISION COMMERCIALS
¶6
Before the advent of television, “a relatively small group of theater
owners” possessed oligopolistic control over access to films. 18 They earned
their revenue by charging the public for each viewing. The advent of
television opened up a new market for “live and shorter duration
programming,” and also provided a secondary market for films released in
theaters. 19 Broadcast television could reach a wide audience at a marginal
cost of zero. 20 However, with this new technology came a new
complication. Initially, copyright owners and broadcasters could not charge
their customers on a per viewing basis. Instead, they developed an
advertising-based model where the payments of advertisers, rather than the
direct financial contribution of consumers became the primary source of
funding. 21 With only three stations available, playing advertisements at
approximately the same time, consumers had little choice but to watch
advertisements, 22 each lasting sixty seconds in length. 23 Advertisers could
also pay to place their name on the title of the television program, as was
the case with NBC’s “Colgate Theatre” and “Texaco Star Theater.” 24
¶7
Not until Sony introduced the Betamax video recording device, a
storage device later known as the VCR, could consumers fast forward
through commercials on programs that they recorded without watching.25
In the alternative, they could pause their VCRs to avoid taping the
commercials, a tactic that required watching the commercials to
appropriately time the button pressing. Commercial-skipping technology

18

Peter S. Menell, Can Our Current Conception of Copyright Law Survive the
Internet Age?: Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 63, 106 (2002–2003).
19
Id.
20
Konstantinos Chorianopoulos & Diomidis Spinellis, Coping with TiVo :
Opportunities of the Networked Digital Video Recorder, 24 TELEMATICS AND
INFORMATICS 48, 50 (2007).
21
Menell, supra note 18, at 106.
22
Id. at 107.
23
Tina M. Lowrey et al., The Future of Television Advertising, in MARKETING
COMMUNICATION: NEW APPROACHES, TECHNOLOGIES, AND STYLES 113, 121
(Allan J. Kimmell ed., 2005).
24
Joe Flint & Emily Nelson, “All My Children” Gets Revlon Twist, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 15, 2002, at B1.
25
See JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE
ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR 114-16 (Norton & Co. 1987) (reporting television
executives’ newfound fears of consumers skipping commercials).
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was available in these analog VCRs, 26 but this technology was not
particularly effective or convenient. 27 It did not present as much of a threat
to the entertainment industry as the DVR. 28 With the capacity to fastforward through commercials and unwanted materials sixty times the
regular playback speed, and more convenient features to select television
programming to be recorded, the advent of DVR in the late 1990s posed a
“cataclysmic” event to some executives in the entertainment industry. 29 Out
of this new technology emerged two rivals: SonicBlue, which manufactured
ReplayTV, and TiVo. 30 Only TiVo remains; pending lawsuits pressured
SonicBlue to file for bankruptcy. 31 TiVo survived because it adopted a
friendly approach toward television networks by eliminating the form of
commercial skipping most attractive to consumers. 32 Because of TiVo’s
conciliatory approach and SonicBlue’s bankruptcy, consumers can no
longer use technology that can skip commercials in thirty second
increments, or better yet, automatically detect and erase commercials. 33

II. CONSUMER INTERESTS
¶8
In Sony, the Supreme Court intimated the autonomy of the
consumer. 34 No longer could the network and entertainment industry hold

26

Chorianopoulos & Spinellis, supra note 200, at 51.
See Rob Pegoraro, Adding Replay Value to TV, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1999, at
N78 (describing ReplayTV’s “Quick Skip” feature as “very empowering” and
not prone to the mistake that commercial-skip VCRs make in being “fooled by
momentary blank screens in the middle of a show”); see Lewis, supra note 13
(“The VCR proved too unwieldy to be used for anything but rented videos. The
remote control enabled people to surf but not so much that they spooked Procter
& Gamble and General Motors and the rest.”).
28
Chorianopoulos & Spinellis, supra note 200, at 51.
29
Frank Rose, The Fast-Forward, On-Demand, Network-Smashing Future of
Television, WIRED, Oct. 2003,
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.10/tv.html [hereinafter Rose, FastForward]; see Michael Freedman Zapper War, FORBES, Jul 8, 2002,
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2002/0708/046.html (noting how fast TiVo
enable viewers to speed through commercials).
30
Farhad Manjoo, TiVo Town or SonicBlue City?, WIRED, Jun. 6, 2002,
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,53008,00.html.
31
Kevin Lemley, The Innovative Medium Defense: A Doctrine to Promote the
Multiple Goals of Copyright in the Wake of Advancing Digital Technologies,
110 PENN ST. L. REV. 111, 155 (2005).
32
See Menell, supra note 18, at 171-72 (contrasting the strategies TiVo and
SonicBlue toward the entertainment industry and noting the corresponding
outcomes).
33
See id. at 125 (describing the features of ReplayTV that are now extinct).
34
Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397,
408 (2003).
27

200x

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. x

their audience captive to rigid television programming schedules. VCR
technology freed consumers from these shackles. The Court quoted with
approval the testimony of Fred Rogers, president of the corporation that
owned and produced Mr. Rogers’ Neighborhood, who spoke of the
autonomy of the consumer:
Very frankly, I am opposed to people being programmed by others.
My whole approach in broadcasting has always been, “You are an
important person just the way you are. You can make healthy
decisions.” Maybe I’m going on too long, but I just feel that anything
that allows a person to be more active in the control of his or her life,
in a healthy way, is important. 35
¶9
Mr. Rogers referred to the sovereignty of individuals to make their
products work for them and their daily activities. 36 For similar reasons,
Professor Ralph Brown extolled “the consumer as an individual,” 37 whose
autonomy is threatened by “a bombardment of stupefying symbols.” 38
Judicial recognition of the sovereignty of the individual to be free from
corporate dominance can be traced back to 1904, when the Supreme Court
sustained the government’s argument that a failure to enforce Congressional
antitrust legislation would put “the public at the absolute mercy of the
holding corporation.” 39 When the Court used similar language in the same
opinion, it reaffirmed its admonishment against putting the consumer “at the
mercy of a single holding.” 40
¶10
The Supreme Court has promoted traditional competition, confined
to a single sector of the economy or a single vertical channel 41 Under this
arrangement, a distributor of a product may be brought into traditional
competition with the manufacturers of that product. For example, in
Addyson Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, the Court enforced the Antitrust
Act of 1890 against a cartel of cast-iron pipe manufacturers conspiring to
reduce competition. 42 In Northern Securities Co. v. United States, The
Court enforced the same Act against railroad operators forming an unlawful
combination to inhibit competition. 43 Laws promoting traditional
competition like the Antitrust Act protect against both horizontal
35

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 445 n.27
(1984).
36
See id.
37
Ralph S. Brown. Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of
Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L. J. 1165, 1180 (1948).
38
Id. at 1182.
39
N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 325 (1904).
40
Id. at 327.
41
See Lemley, supra note 31, at 137 (describing different types of competition).
42
175 U.S. 211, 212 (1899).
43
193 U.S. 317-18 (1904).
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agreements and vertical agreements. 44 They give the consumer a greater
choice among competing brands and products, thus promoting the
sovereignty of the consumer. Autonomous competition also protects the
sovereignty of the consumer and the interests of the public, but through a
different process that materializes with the advent of new technologies. 45
Joseph Schumpeter referred to this process as “creative destruction,” which
he argued constitutes “the fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the
capitalist markets from failing.” 46 Schumpeter’s observation reflects a
lesson that history has repeatedly taught: the exclusion of perceived threats
to markets, products, and economic structures often undermines progress by
rewarding inefficiency. The consequences of neglecting this lesson have
become apparent with the history of copyright law.
¶11
Copyright tends to emerge from the “interstices of the censorship,”
according to Benjamin Kaplan’s interpretation of Sir Henry Maine’s
aphorism. 47 As early as 1586, the Star Chamber decreed a system of
licensing books before their publication and granting patents for works
meeting the approval of censors. 48 The major stationers ultimately gained
control of “a large number of patents,” 49 just as the television networks of
today own the copyrights to television shows. Through this decree, the
English Crown censored books and restrained ideas. 50 Currently, a more
subtle, less alarming, but still malignant kind of censorship targets the
practice of a particular idea. The chill of litigation, the ghost of the
Sonicblue bankruptcy, discourages the creation of new market structures,
which fuels the capitalist economy and drives technological progress. 51
¶12
The Supreme Court promoted this kind of competition long before
Schumpeter did with its 1837 decision Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge. 52 This case arose because of the decision of entrepreneurs to defy
economic conventions and usurp “one of the most profitable companies in

44

See, e.g. N. Sec., 193 U.S. at 335, 337 (observing how Congress promotes free
competition by prohibiting horizontal agreements by railroad companies to
refrain from competition).
45
See id.
46
See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Grokking Grokster, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1217,
1276 (2005).
47
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT REPUBLISHED 4
(Iris C. Geik et al. eds., Matthew Bender & Co. 2005) (1967).
48
Id. at 3-4.
49
Id. at 4.
50
Id.
51
See Kutler, supra note 177, at 160 (“The doctrine of the Charles River Bridge
case provided, and continues to offer, the formal answer because it fashioned a
legal doctrine to justify the process of creative destruction.”).
52
36 U.S. 420 (1837).
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its day,” The Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge. 53 This corporation
emerged after the decision of the Massachusetts legislature to replace a
ferry service from Charlestown to Boston with a bridge. 54 In 1785, it
chartered the company The Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge to
construct this new mode of transportation, to operate it, and to charge tolls
for forty years. 55 The legislature subsequently extended this term to seventy
years, but the demand for access to the bridge exceeded its capacity before
this term expired. 56 To meet this increased demand, the Warren Bridge
emerged. 57 It received permission to charge the same tolls as the Charles
River Bridge for six years; after this point, the public could access the
bridge for free. 58 The Warren Bridge received a “fixed profit” from its six
years charging tolls. 59 It represented the superior business model (and
encouraged states to grant charters that better served the public interest), 60
just as the Charles River Bridge exploited superior technology to supplant
the more expensive ferry boats that held its customers to more inflexible
More inefficient technologies and businesses have
schedules. 61
continuously faced destruction by superior competition, a principle
recognized by Chief Justice Taney:
Turnpike roads have been made in succession, on the same line of
travel; the later ones interfering materially with the profits of the first.
These corporations have, in some instances, been utterly ruined by the
introduction of newer and better modes of transportation and traveling.
In some cases, railroads have rendered the turnpike roads on the same
53

Ku, supra note 46, at 1235.
Id. at 1234-35.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 1235.
57
Id. at 1234.
58
Id.
59
See id. at 1240 (“The Charles River Bridge investors could have insisted that
the charter include an express grant of monopoly privileges, and the state could
have chosen to fund the construction of the bridge by guaranteeing only the
recovery of costs and some fixed profit similar to the charter for the Warren
Bridge.”).
60
See Kutler, supra note 17, at 19-23, 29-30 (describing how public
dissatisfaction with the Charles River Bridge over issues such as narrowness,
excessive crowds, dangerousness, and excessive tolls promoted the development
of new business models that did not entail the “public injustice” of “heavy
tolls”); See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW:
1836-1937, at 112 (1991) (“The state originally should have granted a charter
that permitted the private company to collect tolls until it recovered its costs plus
profits, when the bridge would become the state’s.”).
61
See Kutler, supra note 177, at 7-8, 12-13 (describing the problems with the
ferry service and public enthusiasm for replacing the ferry service with a
bridge).
54
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line of travel so entirely useless, that the franchise of the turnpike
corporation is not worth preserving. 62
¶13
The Chief Justice wrote during the emergence of new forms of
autonomous competition. He recognized that “newer and better modes of
transportation” should out-compete obsolete ones in the most traditional
sense. 63 The competitor offering the best services at the cheaper prices
should win. But new technologies can also discipline existing ones with the
threat of market adoption or market extinction. 64 It can force companies
like the Charles River Bridge to adjust to new business structures and
experiment with ideas that would not otherwise be considered. Competitors
in this realm of technology may in fact find one another mutually beneficial,
but only if they learn to utilize one another.
¶14
For example, when Sony introduced the VCR, it forced the
entertainment industry to adapt to this new public benefit—to spend
resources adjusting to new distribution mechanisms. 65 It did not directly
compete with this new technology in the traditional sense because VCRs
occupied a different market; VCRs and television programming were not
substitutes for one another. Indeed, they were complements that eventually
expanded the markets of one another, yet the entertainment industry feared
that VCRs would render its primary source of revenues, advertising, a
nullity. It also feared that as more viewers shifted to using VCRs, the
ratings would decline because of inaccuracies in measurement, and
consequently, revenues as well. 66 Out of this fear, it sued Sony for
copyright infringement. 67 Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Sony because of the “public interest in making television broadcasting more
available.” 68 Just as the Warren Bridge served the public interest by
facilitating transportation across the river, the Betamax served the public
interest by facilitating access to television. 69 Just as the bridge freed the
public from the rigid time schedules of ferries, the VCR freed the public
from rigid television programming schedules. In each case, markets were
disrupted for the sake of economic efficiency and the public interest.

62

Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 551-52 (1837).
Id. at 551.
64
See SCHUMPETER, supra note 177, at 85 (“It disciplines before it attacks.”).
65
See LARDNER, supra note 255, at 323-24 (“By 1985 the flow of theatrical
movies into home video was slowing down, while the output of original
programming, mainly in the how-to and kid vid genres, was speeding up; and
the studios were doing their best to adjust.”).
66
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 452 (1984).
67
See id. at 420.
68
Id. at 454.
69
Ku, supra note 466, at 1247 (drawing a similar analogy between Charles
River Bridge and peer-to-peer technology).
63
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As the Ninth Circuit observed in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v.
Grokster, “[t]he introduction of new technology is always disruptive to old
markets, and particularly to those copyright owners whose works are sold
through well-established distribution mechanisms. Yet, history has shown
that time and market forces often provide equilibrium in balancing
interests . . . .” 70 This case, ultimately overturned by the Supreme Court,
arose from peer-to-peer music file sharing technology, but it was the
expressed illegal purpose of the defendants that led the Court to rule against
the defendants because of their intent to induce copyright infringement. 71
The effort of defendant companies to usurp the source of demand from the
entertainment industry constituted a particularly salient feature of intent.72
One of the defendants displayed a particularly egregious disregard for the
law when he declared that “[t]he goal is to get in trouble with the law and
get sued. It’s the best way to get in the new[s].” 73 Perhaps this flagrantly
illegal intent led Justice Breyer to distinguish Grokster from other
technological innovations in his concurring opinion, joined by Justices
Stevens and O’Connor. 74 Justice Breyer made this distinction after
acknowledging the litany of legal uses that Grokster technology may offer
in the future: “Of course, Grokster itself may not want to develop these
other noninfringing uses. But Sony’s standard seeks to protect not the
Groksters of this world (which in any event may well be liable under
today’s holding), but the development of technology more generally.”75
Therefore, Grokster does not disturb the protection Sony affords to
emerging technology and autonomous competition. According to Justice
Breyer, Sony shelters technologies “that help disseminate information and
ideas more broadly or more efficiently,” such as VCRs and digital
recorders. 76
¶15

¶16
Justice Breyer’s analysis expounds upon the tension that the
majority of the Court recognized “between the respective values of
supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting
innovation in new communication technologies by limiting the incidence of
liability for copyright infringement.” 77 Only what the Court considers
creative pursuits, Breyer appears to suggest, “help disseminate information
and ideas more broadly or more efficiently.” 78 However, while the majority
70

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. 380 F.3d 1154, 1167
(9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
71
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 941.
72
Id. at 939.
73
Id. at 925.
74
Id. at 949-55 (Breyer, J., concurring).
75
Id. at 955 (Breyer, J., concurring).
76
Id. at 957 (Breyer, J., concurring).
77
Id. at 928.
78
Id. at 957 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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answered the question of whether Grokster’s product is “capable of
‘substantial’ or ‘commercially significant’ noninfringing uses” by
answering what infringement and culpable intent mean, 79 Breyer focused
more on the creative promise of noninfringement uses. 80 In other words, the
majority and concurrence agreed on the same basic question, but diverged
only in which side of the legal coin it paid attention to– positive creative
promise or illegal, culpable infringement. Both are important. 81
¶17
Commercial-skipping technology also introduces autonomous
competition. Once again, the entertainment industry has fought this
technology because of similar fears over loss of revenues from advertising,
but once again, these fears may prove unfounded. Commercial-skipping
technology can force television networks to reevaluate their policies toward
advertisers, but this would make advertising more efficient for the consumer
through DVRs. 82
¶18
Even the greatest enemies of commercial skipping, who consider
the technology a form of theft, namely, former head of Turner Broadcasting
Systems Jamie Kellner, acknowledge the way the technology motivates
them to provide more convenience to consumers: “I’m a big believer we
have to make television more convenient or we will drive the penetration of
PVRs and things like that, which I’m not sure is good for the cable industry
or the broadcast industry or the networks.” 83 For Kellner, the threat of
purported theft generates creativity, or at least the expenditure of corporate
resources to better serve the consumer. 84 If networks decrease the amount
of commercials, they would also decrease the incentive of consumers to
invest in commercial-skipping technology. The commercial skip feature
would also encourage consumers to substitute away from analog VCRs to
DVRs. This technology can “unbundle ads from the content” and instead
personalize them to an individual’s personal characteristics. 85 Although
commercials would decline, they would also be individually tailored to the
viewer’s interests. Consequently, consumers could spend less time learning
only about products that would interest them.
79

Id. at 934.
Id. at 949 (Breyer, J., concurring).
81
Id. at 934.
82
Randal Picker, The Digital Video Recorder: Unbundling Advertising and
Content, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 205, 207 (2004).
83
Interview of Jamie Kellner, VOD’s Ad-Skipping Irks Kellner, in Staci D.
Kramer, Content’s King, CABLE WORLD 32 (Apr. 29, 2002); see Picker, supra
note 82, at 206 (describing Kellner’s position and his attack on commercialskipping technology as “infamous[]”).
84
Interview of Jamie Kellner, supra note 83 (calling commercial skipping theft
when asked to explain why PVRs pose a threat that motivated him to make
television more convenient)
85
Picker, supra note 82, at 207.
80
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Through unbundling, consumers would receive a greater benefit
from the commercial itself: information. Commercials inform the consumer
about product qualities, prices, and other information that can enable them
to make more rational purchasing decisions. 86 Fewer, but far more relevant,
advertisements reduce the search costs borne by the consumer in sifting
through and processing this information. Because commercial technology
facilitates the dissemination of commercial information more efficiently, it
meets Sony’s standard as interpreted by Justice Breyer in Grokster: “Sony
thereby recognizes that the copyright laws are not intended to discourage or
control the emergence of new technologies, including (perhaps especially)
those that help disseminate information and ideas more broadly or more
efficiently.” 87 The current use of this efficiency-enhancing technology has
less legal relevance than the potential use:
¶19

Sony’s rule is forward looking. It does not confine its scope to a static
snapshot of a product’s current uses (thereby threatening technologies
that have undeveloped future markets). Rather, as the VCR example
makes clear, a product’s market can evolve dramatically over time.
And Sony—by referring to a capacity for substantial noninfringing
uses—recognizes that fact. Sony’s word “capable” refers to a
plausible, not simply a theoretical, likelihood that such uses will come
to pass, and that fact anchors Sony in practical reality. 88

Perhaps even more than the Betamax, DVRs have a great potential
for noninfringing uses. Hollywood itself implicitly recognized this
potential when it invested in the only major DVR technologies: TiVo and
SonicBlue. 89 Disney, NBC, Time Warner, and Viacom’s Showtime
invested in ReplayTV before SonicBlue acquired this product.90 AOL Time
Warner also invested “millions in advertising dollars to help promote the
TiVo service.” 91 These companies saw the potential of DVRs to bolster,
not threaten, the benefits they received from their copyrights. The interests
of consumers and advertisers also converge, for viewers replay commercials
they find interesting. 92
¶20

86

Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U.
L. REV. 975, 1002 (2002) [hereinafter Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure].
87
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 957 (2005)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
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Yet, the entertainment industry filed three lawsuits against
SonicBlue, partly out of concerns over ReplayTV’s capability to skip
commercials. 93 Although the entertainment industry filed lawsuits based on
specific features of its own erstwhile investment, Sony suggests that a
company cannot be sued over the features of a particular product, but only
the product itself: “The sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other
articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the
product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it
need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.” 94 The Court
analyzed the copying equipment—in this case, the VCR—as a single entity.
It did not distinguish between the ability of the equipment to copy videos
from the ability of the equipment to fast-forward through commercials, or to
pause during recording. It could have approved the Betamax on the
condition that Sony eliminate the fast-forward, rewind, and pause functions,
but it did not. 95 Instead, it quoted the District Court’s opinion about how
few consumers exploit the fast-forward feature to skip commercials, and its
conclusion that “[a]dvertisers will have to make the same kinds of
judgments they do now about whether persons viewing televised programs
actually watch the advertisements which interrupt them” with approval. 96
The district court did not analyze the benefit or the cost (aside from
tediousness to the consumer) of the fast-forward feature to the viewer, and
neither did the Supreme Court. Both courts effectively sidestepped this
question. The Supreme Court focused almost exclusively on the “primary
use of the machine:” “time-shifting,” or the ability of the viewers to watch
television recordings according to their own schedules. 97
¶21

III. COMMERCIAL INTERESTS
A shorter duration of television commercials would benefit the
entertainment industry because it would make advertising more attractive to
advertisers who attempt to induce consumers to buy a particular product.
The goal of advertising converges with the goal of the trademark as
described by Justice Frankfurter:
¶22

A trademark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to
select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The
owner of a market exploits this human propensity by making every
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effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing
power of a congenial symbol. 98

Like the trademark, the success of an advertisement depends on its drawing
power. 99 In addition to minimizing confusion over different trade names
and guarding against the misappropriation of creative efforts, trademark
protection aims to prevent the dilution of commercial symbols 100 Dilution
theory suggests that the wider use of a symbol leads to a diminished value,
and laws have been developed according to this theory. 101 Most recently,
the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 aims to protect the trademark
from “conduct that lessens the distinctiveness and value of the mark.” 102
¶23
Likewise, increased clutter in television advertising can reduce the
attention, recall, and persuasion of viewers. 103 These findings raise the
concern of advertisers. 104 Furthermore, diminished audience size has
decreased the demand of advertisers to purchase more commercial
inventory in order to reach the same size of audience. 105 Television
networks tried to compensate by charging more for the same amount of
commercial time. They attempted to boost the demand of advertisers by
making the supply more valuable, but this strategy only caused advertisers
to retreat from their business with television stations. 106 If, instead, the
98

Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresege Co., 316 U.S. 203,
205 (1942), superseded by statute, Lanham Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051, as
recognized in A & H Sportswear v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, 61 U.S.P.Q.2D
1637 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“Both Century Distilling and Mishawaka were decided
prior to the passage of the Lanham [A]ct which, departing from the Trade-Mark
Act of 1905, made any award of monetary relief specifically subject to
‘principles of equity.’”).
99
See Brown, supra note 37, at 1191-92 (explaining the application of dilution
theory to marketing).
100
See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, What Constitutes “Famous Mark” for
Purposes of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §1125(c), Which
Provides Remedies for Dilution of Famous Marks, 165 A.L.R. FED. 625 (2000)
(describing how the Federal Trademark Dilution Act creates remedies in the
case of the dilution of famous marks).
101
See 152 Cong. Rec. H.6963, H.6964 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) ( “A
2003 Supreme Court decision, Mosely v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., compelled
the Committee on the Judiciary to review the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. .
. .Enactment of this bill will eliminate confusion on key dilution issues that have
increased litigation and resulted in uncertainty among the regional circuits.”).
102
152 Cong. Rec. at H.6964 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
103
Robert Kent, Competitive Clutter in Network Television Advertising: Current
Levels and Advertiser Responses, 35 J. ADVERTISING RES. 49, 51 (1995).
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Id. at 49.
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Dec. 1, 2003, at 50.
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television stations reduce the supply of advertisements available, and the
total duration of commercial breaks, then a new equilibrium could be
reached. Commercial-skipping technology catalyzes this process by
exerting additional pressure on television networks to adjust to a market less
dependent on conventional television advertising.
Because commercial-skipping technology can persuade customers
to switch to DVRs, it has the potential to boost the demand of advertisers
through ad personalization. More important than the total audience exposed
to commercials is the audience interested in actually buying the goods. No
matter how enticing the advertisement, a commercial for dog food can never
appeal to people allergic to dogs. 107 A commercial for a luxury
international travel package cannot induce viewers without the budget to
afford it. By unbundling ads from content, advertisers could deliver their
message to their ideal target—not just viewers, but interested viewers.
TiVo users interested in Sprite, for example, have used their remote control
to choose additional exposure to Sprite advertising. 108
¶24

¶25
Advertisers and technology companies could also collaborate to
provide the consumers a greater range of options regarding their level of
exposure to advertisements. Murdoch’s News Corporation exploited the
potential of such a relationship by introducing XTV. 109 This DVR gives
consumers the option of paying a fee to skip advertisements on some
shows. 110 On other shows, consumers may be forced to watch only one ad
for each commercial break with the fast forward feature disabled. 111
Regardless, Murdoch’s News Corporation has worked with advertisers to
offer consumers a product that balances all interests. News Corporation
receives revenues for its product, consumers have a wider range of possible
purchases available, and advertisers have another outlet to serve their clients
without fear of the fast forward button. Although premium channels like
HBO already offer commercial-free television, XTV could introduce a
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See Picker, supra note 82, at 205 (“Next time you turn on your television,
actually watch the commercials and you will quickly see how poorly the
economic model of TV is working. They put on a commercial for dog food, but
you are allergic to dogs.”).
108
Press Release, TiVo Inc., Sprite’s ‘subLYMONal’ Advertising to Be
Featured on TiVo (July 25, 2006), available at
http://investor.tivo.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=106292&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1254260; see Chorianopoulos & Spinellis, supra note 200, at
51.
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110
Frank Rose, Murdoch’s Must-See TV, WIRED, Sep. 2000,
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spectrum of options between television cluttered with ten minutes of ads
every hour and television with absolutely no advertisements. 112
¶26
Technology companies and manufacturers of DVRs also recognize
that cooperation should emerge as the optimal behavior for all parties. As
TiVo spokeswoman Rebecca Baer suggests, the viability of networks is
essential to the commercial success of commercial-skipping technology:
“[a]s much as the consumers have difficulties with networks, they do
provide the content—if you're going to completely alienate them, what will
happen to the content?” 113 Accordingly, both TiVo and SonicBlue have at
least attempted a cooperative approach with the networks whose
advertisements they seek to zap. 114
¶27
There are other alternative, more traditional forms of advertising as
well that would not fall prey to commercial-skipping technology, such as
product placement, which is restrained through regulation. 115 The top three
American networks still manage to place an average of fifteen branded
products on a 30 minute program, approximately 40% of which were
“negotiated product placements.” 116 Television stations even have
integrated commercial products into the plots of their televisions shows, for
a negotiated price. 117 For instance, cosmetics company Revlon paid ABC to
give the company a leading role in its soap opera “All My Children,” as the
company that one of the main characters arranges for her daughter to spy
on. 118 Ford parked its Mustang in the studio audience of Leno’s The
Tonight Show, which according to the show’s host, contained the “best seats
in the house.” 119 It also arranged for American Idol contestants to sing “car
songs” such as “Mustang Sally” and “Fun, Fun, Fun (‘Til Her Daddy Takes
The T-Bird Away).” 120 In 2000, Ford developed, with the help of Lions
Gate Entertainment, its own show, “a trekking-through-the wilderness
reality series” called No Boundaries, named after the tagline for its SUV
campaign. 121 The WB broadcasted the show, but only for six episodes, due
to what the marketing manager at Ford considered lack of commitment on
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See Chorianopoulos & Spinellis, supra note 200, at 56 (“Between the two
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the part of WB. 122 Regardless of the reason, the threat of commercial
skipping has prompted networks to search for creative alternatives to the
staple thirty second television spot. Finally, program sponsorships can give
advertisers a bundle of benefits, including product placements and official
recognition, often through an announcer declaring, “Brought to you
by . . . .” 123
¶28
With all these alternatives, commercial-skipping technology would
not lead to the death of advertising and (for better or worse) the television
business. It would facilitate the more efficient viewing of advertisements,
which could be viewed simultaneously with the real television show (such
as product placements), or perhaps the title, so that consumers can
distinguish similar programming like “Colgate Theatre” and “Texaco Star
Theater.” Since less than half of product placements are negotiated,
television networks could sell more product placements rather than
commercials. Advertisers could still produce just as many commercials, but
viewers would not have to watch them separately. This additional free air
time would reduce the adverse impacts of dilution on advertisers, and the
advertised companies would also benefit from the free time consumers
would gain to make additional purchases. 124 Content owners would also
benefit because this additional air time could be used to attract a greater
variety of consumers. 125 A greater number of television programs would
allow for more opportunities for creative programming ideas, an especially
important prerogative given the reality that “all hits are flukes.” 126 Each
year, the four broadcast networks evaluate “thousands of concepts for new
series” and buy “approximately 600 pilot scripts.” 127 The sheer number of
concepts, ideas, and scripts to evaluate precludes a “reliable basis” for
122

Id. (“We were very proud of ‘No Boundaries,’ says Rich Stoddart, a
marketing manager at Ford. ‘But you can make the most wonderful content in
the world, and without a commitment from a distribution outlet, you have an
audience of one.”).
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Lowrey, et. al. supra note 233, at 120.
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See Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure, supra note 866, at 1007
(“Eventually, the increasing opportunity costs of watching additional television
will exceed the marginal influence of the additional commercials, and, at that
point, additional time spent watching television will actually begin to reduce a
consumer’s spending on the advertised products.”).
125
See Picker, supra note 82, at 207 (comparing the potential of unbundled
advertising to advertisers in specialized magazines who can target particular
varieties of consumers).
126
Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure, supra note 866 at 1018 (quoting Jeff
Sagansky, President, CBS Entertainment as quoted in Betsy Frank, On Air:
Primetime Programming Development 1991–92, 1 (1991)).
127
Id. (quoting William T. Bielby & Denise D. Bielby, “All Hits are Flukes”:
Institutional Decision Making and the Rhetoric of Network Prime-Time
Program Development, 99 AM. J. SOC. 1287, 1288 (1994)).
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selecting the very best. 128 Even if networks could learn which ideas would
receive the most demand, findings in the music industry suggest that low
demand items, in the aggregate, can earn content owners more revenue than
the most popular. 129 In the interests of advertisers, the brands they promote,
and consumers, commercial-skipping technology may save consumers from
some advertisements.
But television networks may develop counter-technology to
counteract commercial-skipping technology. The latter does not have to
reign superior. In fact, it does not. Networks have already outsmarted TiVo
technology, purportedly inadvertently. 130 Television networks occasionally
air a television show a few minutes before it is scheduled to begin. 131 By
following a popular show immediately with a lower-rated show in the place
of a commercial break, networks can charge more for this advertisement
that they delayed in the television schedule. 132 The executive vice president
and general manager of TiVo, Brodie Keast, claimed that the networks did
not intend to undermine the convenience of TiVo, but ABC scheduling
chief Jeff Bader indicated otherwise: “It’s not my job to make it easy for
people to leave our network.” 133 This strategy would counter commercialskipping technology that skips in thirty second intervals, but not technology
that detects commercials automatically.
¶29

¶30
NBC has also devised an incentive approach by captivating viewers
during advertisement segments with “minimovies.” 134 Other networks have
copied this strategy with success. Turner Networks has successfully
courted brands such as MasterCard, Chase, and Sierra Mist by featuring
them prominently in these miniature shows that entertain viewers during
commercial breaks. 135 In order to discourage viewers from exploiting
commercial-skipping technology, TBS made a point of featuring amusing
advertisements by featuring sponsors such as Sonic and Nationwide auto
insurance in its segments entitled “Everybody Loves Funny Commercials,”
during the first commercial break of its show “Everybody Loves
Raymond.” 136 IAG Research indicates that the features of “Everybody
128
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Loves Funny Commercials” enjoy “58% stronger brand recall, 100%
stronger message recall and 60% stronger likeability scores than spots that
ran in the show's traditional commercial pods.” 137 Advertiser’s clients, such
as Sierra Mist, have praised TBS for this initiative, and as IAG Research
findings suggests, consumers have enjoyed the advertisements as well. 138
But even for viewers that never will enjoy advertisements,
automatic commercial detection technology is not impregnable either,
especially given the wide variety of commercial formats. 139 One form of
automatic commercial detection technology searches for black frames
paired with silence, which can indicate the beginning of a commercial
break, but some television stations in France and the Netherlands have
already replaced black frames with different color frames, thereby evading
this commercial detection technology. 140 Some commercial technology
looks for black frames spaced fifteen, thirty, or sixty seconds apart, 141 but
television stations can outsmart this technology by apportioning odd lots of
advertisement time, such as forty-three second or twenty-seven second
spots. Inventors are developing more sophisticated methods of detecting
commercial separators, 142 but these methods can also be counteracted. The
current commercial technology still requires the same kind of guesswork by
commercial-averse viwers as the VCR required. The primary difference is
that commercial-skipping technology is more automatic. As the Sony Court
recognized, the tendency of consumers to avoid advertisements before the
advent of the VCR (for example, by going to another room) remains
constant: “Advertisers will have to make the same kinds of judgments they
do now about whether persons viewing televised programs actually watch
the advertisements which interrupt them.” 143 Advertisers would still accrue
the same kind of benefits they did with the introduction of VCRs: Even if
consumers watching commercials zip past them with the fast-forward
¶31
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feature, there would still be “a positive effect on the recall and the
recognition of Ads, when compared to viewing the same advertising
message just once,” so long as these zipped commercials are watched
repeatedly. 144
¶32
The perceived threat of commercial-skipping technology may also
open new markets, and consequently, new fields of employment.
Companies like Overpeer have grown to assist record labels in countering
file sharing sites by overwhelming them with “spoof files,” 145 and
broadcasters can follow suit. These industries would still come with costs,
but these costs would be borne by the entertainment industry, not by either
the individual users pressured by the entertainment industry to settle
copyright infringement actions, 146 or future entrepreneurial enterprises
chilled from testing the legal limits of consumer freedom. 147 Past
entrepreneurial failures, such as the bankruptcy of SonicBlue, illustrate the
danger of the threat of litigation to nascent innovation. 148 Natural market
forces, not extra litigation, would best resolve potential issues because the
market can best account for society’s interest “in promoting the
development of new technologies and . . . experimenting with new business
opportunities and market structures.” 149

Advertisers and broadcasters have felt the pressure from consumers
and the technology industry to rethink their methods of commercial
promotion, as evidenced by ABC’s effort to integrate Revlon into its soap
opera’s storyline. The costs of conventional advertising outlets encourage
¶33
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this creativity. If they choose to spend their resources countering
commercial-skipping technology instead, the burden will shift to viewers
who have a substantial interest in avoiding exposure to commercials. At
this point, the consumer would have to spend additional resources to acquire
the latest generation of commercial-skipping technology to counter the
efforts of the entertainment industry. If the interest of the entertainment
industry in preventing commercial skipping exceeds the interest of the
consumer in using this technology, the entertainment industry need only
invest in countering the current generation of commercial-skipping
technology to defeat it. Under the efficiency principle, whichever side has a
greater interest in (or against) this technology will prevail by investing more
resources in it.
¶34
If the entertainment industry makes this initial investment to
counter the first generation of commercial-skipping technology, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) would present another obstacle to the
technology industry and the consumer. It prohibits any person from
manufacturing, importing, or providing “any technology, product, service,
device, component, or part thereof” that “is primarily designed or produced
for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively
controls access” to copyrighted works. 150 However, a “substantial
consensus” has emerged that this provision is unconstitutional. 151 It violates
the First Amendment because it impairs the availability of information. 152
It permits copyright owners to exact a price that some individuals may not
be able to afford, possibly even for information that is not protected by
copyright. 153 If anti-circumvention technology controls access to both
copyrighted works and public domain works protected by the First
Amendment, the DMCA precludes any effort to counter this technology,
regardless of the purpose of this counter-technology. 154
¶35
Congress may have also overstepped its constitutional authority to
legislate under the Patent and Copyright Clause. 155 This clause gives
Congress the power “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
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their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 156 The Courts developed the
fair use doctrine, and Congress later codified it, to advance the
constitutionally enshrined Progress of Science, 157 but the DMCA may
hinder the applicability of this doctrine, and consequently, run afoul of the
Constitution. 158 Because of television’s function as a medium of mass
communication relating to science, art, and civic engagement, viewers
should have the freedom and autonomy to access this information in the
most efficient manner.
¶36
Although the DMCA also prohibits imports of such technology,
enforcement problems have already emerged. When Napster’s file sharing
system was held illegal, new services popped up overseas to take its
place. 159 Other services attempted to evade legal accountability through a
decentralized structure. 160 Commercial-skipping technology may share a
similar fate, and such a black market would deprive the state of tax
revenue, 161 and a favorable balance of trade. 162 IV. The New Market
Dynamic
¶37
Copyright and limited monopolies are intended to “motivate the
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward.” 163 Yet, in television, this reward has frequently curtailed
creativity. Too often, copyright holders have sought to sustain their
privileged position by stifling the development of other technologies and
innovations. 164 Excessive energies have already been invested in television
because of excessive copyright incentives. 165 The protection that copyright
provides may mollify the entertainment industry into accepting the market
structure without giving due consideration to other alternatives. On the
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other hand, competition and tough markets breed creativity, as the president
of ABC Daytime, Angela Shapiro acknowledged. In explaining to the Wall
Street Journal the company’s reasons for incorporating Revlon into the
storyline of “All My Children,” she noted advertiser’s concerns about
dilution. 166 She also observed that because of competition to attract
audiences, “none of us can look at what we do as business as usual.” 167
Instead, competition forces these companies to not only create higher
quality products, but also more innovative business strategies.
¶38
Commercial-skipping technology could make a similar impact. It
could act as a competitor, forcing the entertainment industry to strive for
progress and not satisfy itself with the status quo. On the other hand,
broadcasters fear the free, advertiser-sponsored television may end. The
senior vice president of communications for the National Association of
Broadcasters, Dennis Wharton, said, “Our member stations rely solely on
advertising to support free, over-the-air broadcasting.” 168 He feared that “if
advertising is not seen, there's less likelihood that advertisers will pay the
money to purchase advertising.” 169 His insecurities may be well founded,
but this is precisely what drives competition. Competitors attempt to divert
the demand of their products or services from one another; they respond by
making their own products or services more attractive to increase demand.
Product placement, product incorporation, ad personalization, and more
entertaining commercials all qualify as ways to make commercials more
attractive for both advertisers and television networks.
¶39
The Supreme Court took a similar approach in a copyright
infringement action against a group that parodied the song “Oh, Pretty
Woman.” 170 It considered whether the defendant’s parody “would result in
a substantially adverse impact on the potential market for the original.” 171
Because parody’s legitimate criticisms may undermine the demand for a
product, the courts find copyright infringement only when the defendant
usurps demand, rather than merely suppresses it. 172 Likewise, the question
with commercial-skipping technology arises over whether such technology
usurps the market for free television, or merely pressures it to progress.
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Only dominant technologies, technologies that command a high
demand, can usurp. 173 Technologies with little following would be too
insubstantial to present a threat. In antitrust law, the dominance of
corporations is a function of market power. The Supreme Court has
inferred monopoly power from “the predominant share of the market.” 174 A
similar inference may be applied to the question of whether commercialskipping technology could usurp the market for free television. To usurp
the market for free television, commercial-skipping technology must
dominate the alternative form of copying and replaying television: the VCR.
¶40

¶41
Numerous reports indicate that it does not. About ninety percent of
households equipped with a television also have at least one VCR. 175 By
contrast, only twenty-two percent of U.S. households possess some form of
DVR technology, and an additional 13% of households indicated an interest
in owning DVRs. 176 The threat of the DVR and prevalence of commercialskipping technology has waned in the entertainment industry itself. 177
According to Magna Global USA, a “big media-buying shop,” the rate of
DVR penetration has declined, so that at its peak, DVRs will reach only
one-third of American homes with television. 178 If TiVo reached a
penetration rate of thirty to forty percent, only one out of ten commercials
would be lost, far from inducing the demise of free television. 179 Even
among consumers that do possess technology capable of skipping
commercials, not all of them use it. TiVo users only use the playback
feature for forty percent of their prime time viewing, and of that, seventy
percent of commercials are avoided by viewers. 180 Television station
173
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managers like executive vice president of Lifetime, Tim Brooks, would
attribute statistics like these to human nature: “We are couch potatoes.” 181
¶42
Aside from comparing the use of TiVo features to the prevalence of
VCR, the competitiveness of markets can also be gauged by “how far
buyers will go to substitute one commodity for another.” 182 The willingness
of buyers to choose one product or another can be measured with crosselasticity, or more broadly, how high a product’s price must be for
customers to purchase substitutes. The low demand for TiVo indicates that
the payment structure for the DVR machine and the accompanying monthly
subscription have dissuaded potential viewers from adopting commercialskipping technology, according to Roy Rothstein, senior vice president of
programming at Zenith Media. 183 The failure of TiVo as a standalone unit
makes TiVo more amenable to working with cable and satellite services, so
that TiVo can package its product with these services. 184 Consequently,
TiVo and other companies that offer commercial-skipping technology could
face pressure by these services to make their products friendlier toward
advertisers and the entertainment industry. 185 Likewise, cable and satellite
services have much to gain from other features of DVRs, such as
personalized ads. This situation typifies the classic free rider problem. In
other words, individuals would not give up their commercial skipping
preferences in hopes that others would give up theirs to preserve free
television for all. 186 But this problem is avoidable. TiVo could advance the
interests of the consumer in making deals with cable and satellite services.
In fact, they already have. 187 The company envisions itself as a “bridge”
that promotes progress from both sides: consumers and networks. 188 This
arrangement centralizes consumers (or perhaps more accurately, pushes
them aside in favor of TiVo), so that the free rider problem becomes
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irrelevant. 189 Through repeated dealings, 190 and a well-established, bilateral
relationship, 191 the equilibrium would shift in favor of cooperation.
Consequently, these services would receive mutual gain with TiVo through
cooperative product bundling.
¶43
But this solution does not necessarily translate well into equity,
based on the potential objection that TiVo in this arrangement would be the
“free rider.” Viewers just as adverse to commercials as those with DVR
technology must bear the boredom, while the more technologically savvy
do not have to. However, this differential is more closely tied with
transaction costs and the costs of the DVR itself than equity. Even among
the viewers who have purchased DVR technology, they only occasionally
use it to skip commercials. At other times, voluntarily subjecting
themselves to commercials qualifies as the more efficient alternative.

The implications of this technology are more complex than the
prisoner’s dilemma, articulated in its classic formulation by Albert W.
Tucker:
¶44

Two suspects, A and B, are arrested by the police. The police have
insufficient evidence for a conviction, and having separated both
prisoners, visit each of them to offer them the same deal: if one
testifies for the prosecution against the other and the other remains
silent, the betrayer goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full
10-year sentence. If both stay silent, the police can sentence both
prisoners to only six months in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays
the other, each will receive a two-year sentence. Each prisoner must
make the choice of whether to betray the other or to remain silent.
However, neither prisoner knows for sure what choice the other
prisoner will make. 192
¶45
The situation of potential TiVo consumers are analogous in that
they must decide whether to cooperate in refraining from commercial
skipping in order to preserve the current business model of television, or
risk jeopardizing the future viability of television programming by seizing
commercial skipping technology. On the other hand, the decisions
television viewers face are more numerous than the choice of whether to
189
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Evolutionary Game Theory, in THE ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA 23, 23
(Graham Kendall et al. eds., 2007).
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cooperate or defect posed in the classic prisoner’s dilemma. The possible
outcomes exceed the two-by-two payoff matrix in the prisoner’s dilemma:
mutual cooperation, mutual defection, unilateral defection by one prisoner,
or unilateral defection by the other. The first decision confronting TiVo
viewers is whether the technology is worth learning about, and if so, how
much to invest in related search costs. 193 In 2002, seven out of every ten
consumers “didn’t even know what a DVR was.” 194 If consumers invest
little after learning about the technology, they may not learn about the more
controversial features. 195 After buyers of DVRs make their purchases, they
may not want to learn how to use commercial skipping features or spend the
energy required to operate the remote. After all, an empowered couch
potato is still a couch potato. 196 Because of this dizzying array of choices, a
viewer using threatening technology can still contribute to the profits of
television networks. Especially with these viewers’ support, copyright
owners would have a sufficient incentive to create and distribute content
without the full protection of copyright. Copyright owners already have
more incentive than necessary to prompt them to produce their works. 197
¶46
This excess detracts from other parts of the economy by luring
more people than necessary to become authors. 198 Indeed, the television
industry already has more authors than it can evaluate, but copyright
protections tend to drift from the original holders or authors to the
distributors. 199 Because authors and creators of television shows lack the
access to get their ideas across, 200 they lack the bargaining power to retain
their copyrights. Commercial skipping technology may empower these
original copyright holders to air their shows in what would otherwise be
commercial space. If “every hit is a fluke,” then hits are in great supply, but
advertisement time blocks them from entering the market. Consequently,
the consumer would have direct access to a greater variety of creative
works. The relationship between creator and consumer would be more
direct.
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CONCLUSION
¶47
To effect further progress, to pressure networks to adapt more
innovative strategies in making commercials appealing to the consumer, the
form of commercial-skipping technology that appeals to consumers should
be free from the threats of litigation that SonicBlue faced. 201 Automatic
commercial skipping technology pressures television networks to select a
strategy more conducive to the interests of consumers: either make
advertisements more palatable to consumers, or cooperate more with the
competitors of companies that would market automatic commercialskipping technology, such as TiVo or News Corporation. The fact that only
half of product placements on television shows are actually negotiated
suggests that while TiVo has already prompted some progress, television
networks still have not met their potential of making television more
appealing to consumers, and still profitable for businesses.

A greater distribution of commercial skipping technologies would
rebalance bargaining power among advertisers, their clients, television
networks, creators of television programs, the technology industry, and the
consumers they serve. Currently, the networks wield too much power,
derived from excessive copyright protection designated more for creators
than distributors. They have used their dominant market power to insulate
themselves from the interests of other groups: advertisers and their clients
concerned about dilution, creators of television shows who go unnoticed,
and viewers who could be spending their time contributing more efficiently
to the economy.

¶48

¶49
On the other hand, television stations still must survive so that they
can continue to distribute their content free of charge. If they perceive
commercial-skipping technology as the knell of bankruptcy and market
failure, they have a variety of fiscally reasonable alternatives available:
invest in counter-technology, work with advertisers to devise alternatives,
or work with the providers of commercial-skipping technology
themselves—or their competition. The outcome determines whether
commercial skipping technology threatens the entertainment industry more
than it benefits consumers. Accordingly, it guides these groups toward
efficiency. It sets the television market for a new round of autonomous
competition.
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See Lemley, supra note 31, at 156 (“The broadcasters' de facto victory in
ReplayTV prevented the court from setting the standard for evaluating
innovative mediums that enhance consumer autonomy in the digital television
industry. It is necessary to develop that standard now, for digital television will
become the next copyright litigation battleground.”).

